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This essay is mainly concerned with Walter Oi's Disneyland problem:
pricing a fixed input (admission to the park, or Polaroid cameras)
and a variable input (individual rides, or Polaroid film) to maximize
profit, though profit-constrained welfare maximization is also treated.
The structure of demand in such situations is fully described when
customers are either households or competitive firms. The implications
of customer diversity and other market attributes for optimal policies
are presented. The welfare properties of single-price and two-part
tariff monopoly equilibria are compared, and potential welfare gains
from tying contracts are discussed.
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I. Introduction
In a classic essay, Walter Oi [1971] considers a profit-maximizing
Disneyland monopoly setting prices for admission to the park and for
individual rides. The park's costs are assumed to vary only with the
number of rides taken, while households derive utility only from rides,
not from being in the park. If all households were identical, the
optimal policy would be to sell rides at marginal cost and to set the
admission fee so as to convert all the consumers' surplus to profit.
If consumers' tastes differ but the park's management knows the relation
in the population between rides demanded and individual surplus, Oi
indicates that the two prices can be set in a discriminatory fashion to
enhance the park's profits. Our concern here is with this sort of
imperfect discrimination as a response to heterogeneity of potential
buyers.
As Oi argues, situations of this general type are common. Polaroid
film and Polaroid cameras must be used together, for instance, and
Polaroid had a monopoly on instant photography for a considerable time.
If buyer utility depended only on the number of instant photos taken,
not on camera ownership, then Polaroid's pricing problem during its
monopoly period differed from that analyzed by Oi only in that cameras
cost something to produce, while Oi associated zero cost with admis-
sions. Mitchell [1978] uses essentially the Oi demand structure to
analyze the demand for local telephone service as a function of connec-
tion and per-call charges. Metering schemes of various sorts, either
literally involving meters or operating through tying arrangements, may
be described in similar terms.l
Since the Oi paper appeared, a good deal has been written about
i
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two-part tariffs. Most of that writing has focused on the use of such
tariffs by welfare-maximizing legal monopolies.2 This essay, on the
other hand, is concerned mainly with the use of two-part pricing arrang-
ments by profit-maximizing firms, though a number of results scattered
throughout the welfare-maximizing literature are presented in a unified
framework. In both situations, more complex multi-part pricing schemes
are generally more attractive in principle than the arrangements studied
here.3 Such schemes do not appear to be especially common outside the
public utility sector, however. This may be due to legal (Robinson-
Patman) problems associated with quantity discounts or because such
discounts increase the difficulty of preventing resale.
In the general case considered here and in all other studies of
two-part pricing of which I am aware, the monopolist is the sole
supplier of two inputs used in the production of some ultimate com-
modity, which in turn yields either utility or profit. These inputs
can be used in variable proportions; in fact, discrimination turns on
differences in the proportions chosen by different sorts of buyers. 4
One unit of the fixed input (admission to the amusement park, a Pola-
roid camera, access to the telephone network) must be purchased in
order to produce any of the ultimate commodity, but as much as is
desired can be produced with only one unit of the fixed input. Let
R = the price charged by the monopoly for the fixed input,
F = the (constant)marginal cost of producing the fixed input,
and
N = unit sales of the fixed input.
On the other hand, the output of the ultimate commodity varies directly
with the amount of the variable input (merry-go-round rides, Polaroid
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film, telephone calls placed) used. Let
P = the price charged by the monopoly for the variable input,
V = the (constant) marginal cost of producing the variable
input,
and
Q = unit sales of the variable input.
The assumption of constant marginal cost serves mainly to simplify
notation; its relaxation adds little new insight. In some situations
the fixed input may be merely the monopolist's permission to buy the
variable input, while in others it may be the use of a specialized
piece of equipment.
Because the monopoly's two products are complements, both Q and
N generally depend on both R and P. The technology described in the
preceding paragraph restricts the form of that dependence. Though
the existing literature has made some use of these restrictions, this
essay contains what seems to be the first general description of the
structure of the demand functions Q(R,P) and N(R,P).
Three cases are considered here, two of which do not seem to
have been previously studied in detail in this context. Section 2
follows Oi and makes the assumption that all customers are households
and that income effects are zero. This simplest situation, referred
to as Case I below, provides a useful benchmark. Section 3 inves-
tigates the implications of two more complex situations. In
Case II, customers are households, but non-zero income effects are
allowed. Only Ng and Weisser [1974] seem to have considered this
5
situation in the present context. Some of the classic tying con-
tracts and metering schemes involve industrial equipment sold or
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leased to competing firms. Accordingly, Section 3 also deals with
Case III, in which all customers are competitive firms selling in
the same market and able collectively to alter the price in that mar-
ket. (If all customers are competitive firms facing fixed output
prices, Section 3 indicates that Case I applies.) Case III seems
not to have been analyzed before in this context; our treatment is
based on the work of Panzar and Willig [1978].
Cases II and IIIdiffer from Case I in that changes in R affect
the demand for the variable input by infra-marginal buyers, those
whose decision to purchase the fixed input is unaffected. In Case
II this occurs because of straightforward income effects, while in
Case III infra-marginal firms respond to changes in the downstream
output price induced by entry and exit of marginal firms.
Sections 4 and 5 consider the equilibrium conditions for a
monopoly controlling both inputs. This situation is naturally and
instructively imbedded in the standard problem of maximizing aggre-
gate Marshallian welfare subject to a profit constraint. The opti-
mality conditions are expressed in terms that permit intuitive
interpretations. Because Case I is noticeably simpler than the
other two, Section 4 concentrates on it. Section 5 then considers
the implications of income effects in Case II and output price effects
in Case III. It turns out that normal consumer goods (II) resemble
inferior inputs (III) here, while normal inputs resemble inferior
goods. The results of Oi [1971] and others on the relation between
P and V are generalized, as is the Ng and Weisser [1974] analysis of
conditions under which R must be non-negative. It is shown that the
Leland-Meyer [1976] proof that if F = O in Case I, R must be positive
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does not generalize to Cases II and III. Moreover, it is shown that
if F is positive (as in the Polaroid and telephone examples), it
may well be optimal to set R less than F, to sell the fixed input
below cost and earn all profit on the variable input.7 Since P = V
and R > F is optimal when buyers are identical households, it is
perhaps not surprising that buyer diversity is one factor tending
to make R < F optimal.
Section 6 compares the various Case I equilibria described in
Section 4 under the assumption of "slight" monopoly power, which
ensures that the equilibria are "close". Section 7 extends this
analysis to Cases II and III. As one might expect by analogy with
classic second- and third-degree price discrimination, the output
and welfare implications of a movement from monopoly over one input
alone to a two-part pricing monopoly depend on the demand structure.8
Under plausible conditions, it is shown that if a monopoly over the
fixed (variable) input is extended to both inputs by a tying contract
or equivalent pricing arrangement, aggregate welfare and total sales
of the fixed (variable) input both rise. It is also argued that
equity considerations do not provide much justification for antitrust
hostility toward tying contracts. On the other hand, two-part pricing
that involves persistent sales below cost of one of the inputs is shown
generally to lead to drops in Marshallian welfare.
II. Demand Relationships: Case I
We assume a continuous distribution of household types, indexed
by . Without loss of generality, suppose that 0 < e < 1. One might
associate with household income in some situations, but there is no
need to make that association explicit in general. Let
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S(P,e) = Marshallian surplus enjoyed by a household of
type when R = 0.
q(P,e) = the quantity of the variable input purchased by
a household of type when R = 0.
The quantity S is the area between the ordinary individual demand
curve and the price line. It follows from the geometry of the situ-
ation that S(P,E)/aP = -q(P,e).
Assume that S is increasing in e in the relevant region. That
is, assume that over the range of values of P considered, the order-
ing of households by surplus enjoyed does not change. This certainly
holds if demand curves corresponding to different 's never cross,
as Littlechild [1975], Leland and Meyer [1976], and others have
assumed, but it is somewhat more general. If the individual demand
curves don't cross or, more generally, if those who buy more of the
variable input enjoy the larger surpluses, it must be that
aq(P,e)/Oe > 0. This is referred to as the direct case, with
aq(P,0)/e negative in the inverse case. It is not necessary that
either of these occur, of course, since the sign of q/X0 may vary
with for any or all values of P.
A household of type e will rationally purchase one unit of the
fixed input if and only if S(P,G) > R. If and only if the fixed input
is purchased, the household will buy q(P,O) units of the variable
input. The main role of the assumption that S is increasing in 0
is to ensure that the marginal customer type, defined implicitly by
S(P,0) = R (1)
is unique. If this assumption is relaxed so that (1) may have
multiple solutions, much of what follows goes through with weighted
-7-
averages of marginal customers' purchases appearing in the obvious
places; see Ng and Weisser [1974, Appendix] for a discussion.
The analysis below deals mainly with situations in which some
but not all households buy the fixed input, so that 0 < < 1. This
seems the most generally relevant case for applications, and once it
is understood the analysis of either excluded polar case is rela-
tively straightforward. As long as S is smooth, differentiation of
(1) totally yields
6R = 1/S0(P,0) > 0, and (2a)
A A A AA
ep = q(P,0)/S0(P,0) = q R > 0 (2b)
where here and in all that follows subscripts indicate partial dif-
ferentiation and q = q(P,O). The relation between these two deriva-
tives arises because the marginal consumer is excluded by lowering
his post-purchase real income, and the income effects of a small
increase in R of AR and a small increase of AP in P are equivalent
if and only if AR = qAP. Relations in (2) establish that N is
decreasing in both R and P in Case I.
If m(0) is the density function of household types, N and Q
are given by the following integrals:
1 1
N(R,P) - A f m(O)dO, Q(R,P) = A f q(P,O)m(0)dO (3)
O(R,P) O(R,P)
With income effects assumed away in Case I, the following quantity
measures only the infra-marginal substitution effect:
1
= A qp (P,O)m()dO (4)
O(R,P)
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Differentiation of (3), substitution from (4), and use of (2) yield
Proposition 1: In Case I, the demand derivatives are related as
~~~^ ^ 9
follows: (a) Np = qNR = QR' and (b) Qp = qNp + o.
The first quality in (a) follows directly from (2); it simply
re-states the fact that a small variable input price increase of AP
has the same exclusion effect as an increase of qAP in the fixed input
price. That is, they impose the same post-purchase real income loss
on the marginal buyer. The second equality in (a) follows because
increases in R lower sales of the variable input only by excluding
marginal buyers of the fixed input; with no income effects, R is
otherwise irrelevant. Part (b) shows that the impact of P on Q is
made up of an exclusion effect of the type just discussed and an
infra-marginal substitution effect. Note that q, a, and one of the
four demand derivatives serve to determine the other three deriv-
atives. The (standard) assumptions made here thus impose considerable
structure on demand.
III. Demand Relationships: Cases II and III
In order to add income effects to the model just considered so
as to move to Case II, it is convenient to define
I(P,Y,G) = the indirect utility function of a household
of type Owith income Y able to purchase the
variable input at price P.
A gross surplus measure can be defined as follows, where Y(O), is the
pre-purchase income of a household of type .
S(RP,O) = I[P,Y(e)-R,0] - I[,Y(O),e] + R
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The first term on the right gives the utility enjoyed if R is spent
on the fixed input and the variable input is then purchased at P,
while the second term gives the utility level corresponding to
exclusion from this market. The difference between them gives the
surplus, in units of utility, enjoyed by a household purchasing the
variable input.
Let us assume that there exists a set of cardinal indirect
utility functions, consistent with household preferences, such that
S8(R,P,e) is positive in the relevant region, as before. Then it
is clear that S(R,P,O) = R uniquely defines the marginal household
type. This condition itself is not dependent on choice of a cardinal
representation. Let us also assume in all that follows that I has
been normalized so that Iy[P,Y(O)-R,0] = 1 for all 0 > . This
amounts to assuming that income is distributed optimally in norma-
10
tive analysis; here it serves mainly to simplify notation. With
this assumption, differentiation and Roy's Theorem yield 11
OR = l/S(R,P,O) > 0 (5a)
A A A A AA
Op = - I [P,Y(0)-R,e]/S (R,P,0) = qeR > 0 (5b)
The only substantive difference between equations (2) and (5) is that
in (5b), q is a function of R as well as of P and 0. It is also easy
to verify that SR(R,P,0) = 0 and Sp(R,P,0) = -q(R,P,0). Thus for
purposes of demand analysis Cases I and II differ mainly in that
infra-marginal households' demands vary with R in Case II.
Two different infra-marginal income effects appear in this Case:
1 1
= ^ f qy(0)m(O)d0, n' = f q(0)qy(0)m(0)de (6)
0(R,P) O(R,P)
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where qy(e) is the derivative of the demand of customer type 
with respect to income. If both and n' are positive (negative)
in the relevant region, the ultimate commodity here is called a
normal good (inferior good) in what follows. (In general, of course,
q and ' may be of different signs and may change sign as R and P
change.) With the own-price derivatives in (4) now explicitly in-
terpreted as utility-constant compensated derivatives, straight-
forward differentiation and use of the Slutsky decomposition yield
the required generalization of Proposition 1:
Proposition 2: In Case II, the demand derivatives are related as
follows: (a) Np = qNR, (b) QR = qNR- n, and (c) QP = qNp + - i'.
The intuition behind part (a) is exactly as before: the exclu-
sion effect depends on the amount by which the post-purchase real
income of the marginal buyer is lowered. Part (b) shows that the
impact of R on Q consists of an exclusion effect, as in Proposition
1, plus an infra-marginal income effect. For a normal good, the
real income fall caused by a rise in R serves to reduce infra-
marginal demand for the variable input. Similarly, part (c) splits
the impact of P on Q into an exclusion effect, an infra-marginal
substitution effect, and another infra-marginal income effect.
Let us now turn to Case III, in which all customers are competing
firms. Assume that all produce a single ultimate output, with x(e)
the supply of a firm of type . Let Z be the price of the ultimate
output, and let D(Z) be the corresponding market demand function.
(In this context, the activities of firms producing this same output
but not using the fixed input considered here are assumed to be re-
flected in D(Z), which is thus a net demand curve facing the relevant
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set of firms.) It is natural to define
S(P,Z,O) = the (economic) profit earned by a firm of type 0
with input price P, output price Z, and R = 0.
The fixed input will be purchased by any firm if and only if
S > R, exactly as above. Let us continue to assume that it is possible
to order customers so that S is increasing in everywhere relevant.
By Hotelling's Lemma,1 2
Sp(P,Z,0) = -q(P,Z,e), (7a)
Sz(P,Z,8) = x(P,Z,e), and (7b)
Spz(P,Z,6) = -qz(P,Z,8) = xp(P,Z,6) (7c)
If Z is fixed, it should be clear that the analysis of Case I applies
exactly. Then (7a) is the necessary derivative property, S > R is
the test for purchase, and infra-marginal demand for the variable
input is independent of R. (If a firm decides to operate at all,
R becomes a sunk cost.)
If the relevant set of firms can affect the output price, the
situation becomes more complicated. One must consider Z as a function
of R and P and then exploit relations (7). The highlights of the
development are given in the Appendix. Two infra-marginal output
price effects arise here:
R = (Z /ZR)^ qz( )m()d (8)
6(R,P)
If we are dealing with a normal input (inferior input), qz is posi-
tive (negative).13 It is shown in the Appendix that increases in R
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always raise Z, so that R is positive (negative) for a normal
(inferior) input. In the normal case, an increase in P serves both
to exclude marginal suppliers and to reduce the supply of infra-
marginal firms. Both effects increase Z, so that P is also positive
for a normal input. As Panzar and Willig [1978] stress, however,
increases in P raise the optimal outputs of infra-marginal firms in
the inferior case, and Zp and P have indeterminate signs in that
case.
Differentiation of (3), treating q as a function of P, Z(R,P),
and , and exploitation of the relations developed in the Appendix
yield the demand relationships for Case III:
Proposition 3: In Case III, the demand derivatives are related as
R p
follows: (a) Np = QR = qNR + and (b) Qp = qNp + + P
In part (b), a is defined by (4) with qp understood to be also a
function of Z. Thus is a negative infra-marginal substitution term
as in Cases I and II, except that output price is held constant here,
not utility or profit.1 4
From Proposition 1, N = QR in the absence of any effects on
infra-marginal demand. This equality is not generally valid in Case
II because R may affect directly the infra-marginal demand for the
variable input, while P clearly can never affect the infra-marginal
demand for the fixed input. This equality is valid in Case III, as
Proposition 3 indicates, where R does not have any such direct infra-
marginal effect. Since Np = QR with Z constant, since there are no
direct infra-marginal effects involved, and since only induced changes
in Z need to be considered in both cases, it is perhaps not too
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surprising that Np = QR when Z is allowed to change to restore full
equilibrium.
The second equality in part (a) of Proposition 3 decomposes the
impact of R on Q into an exclusion effect and an output price effect.
For normal inputs, the latter tends to offset the former. As suppliers
drop out of the market, the output price tends to rise, increasing
the input demands of infra-marginal firms. Note that in Case II,
the income effect adds to the exclusion effect for normal goods. In
the normal case, part (a) also indicates that a small price increase
of AP has less impact on N than a small increase in R of q(AP). This
is because the increase in P lowers infra-marginal supplies for all
values of Z, thus tending to raise Z and offset the exclusion effect,
while changes in R have no direct infra-marginal impact.
A comparison of parts (b) of Propositions 2 and 3 shows that a
normal input also behaves like an inferior consumer good when P
changes. In both cases, increases in P that tend to exclude marginal
buyers are offset to some extent by increases in infra-marginal
demand. Since P cannot be signed in general for inferior inputs,
the analogy between them and normal consumer goods is less exact.
IV. Equilibria and Optima: Case I
The standard distribution-free welfare measure used in all that
follows: 1
1 1
W(R,P) = f D(x)dx + ^ f {S(P,..,O) - F + (P-V)q(P,..,0)}m(O)d6, (9)
Z(R,P) O(R,P)
where Z is a constant in Cases I and II, and the unlisted arguments
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in the second integrand are (I) none, (II) R, and (III) Z(R,P).
Note that in Case III, the Marshallian measure is applied to the
ultimate commodity.
It is straightforward to verify that in all three Cases, the
first-order conditions for maximization of W can be written
WR = (R-F)NR(R,P) + (P-V)QR(R,P) = 0 (10a)
Wp = (R-F)Np(R,P) + (P-V)Qp(R,P) = 0 (10b)
These are obviously satisfied by marginal cost pricing, by setting
16
R = F and P = V. If one of the two prices is fixed above cost and
profitability is not a binding constraint, conditions (10) show that
the other price should be set below cost. The two goods are comple-
ments, so that second-best pricing involves offsetting exogenous dis-
tortions, not the sort of distortion matching one thinks of for
substitutes. The second-order conditions that ensure that marginal
cost pricing maximizes W are the following:
NR < 0, Qp < 0, and NRQP - (Np) > 0 (11)
By Proposition 1, the third of these is satisfied in Case I because
a is negative, and the first two also hold for all non-negative R
and P.
Figure 1 shows the relevant geometry near the marginal-cost-
pricing point, w. The locus RW(P) is defined by (10a), PW(R) by
(lob). Both are negatively sloped at w, and the second-order con-
ditions ensure that the former intersects the latter from below. The
ellipse is an iso-W curve.
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It is convenient to express some of the conditions developed
below in terms of the following demand elasticities:
P Re = - Op(P/Q), e - - QR(R/Q)' (12a)
P R= - Np(P/N), B = - N (R/N), (12b)
-p
e = - Qp(P/Q)= - [Qp - (Np/NR)QR] (P/Q), (12c)
PR =- NR(R/N) = - [NR - (QR/Qp)Np](R/N). (12d)
Note that Qp is the compensated derivative of Q with respect to P,
with R changed so as to hold N constant. Similarly, NR is the Q-con-
stant derivative of N with respect to R. In general, NR = QR(NR/QP)'
-P
In Case I, Qp = a, so that Qp and NR are negative, and both e and
1R are positive.
If a firm monopolizes the fixed input only and must treat the
price of the variable input as exogenous, it will choose R so as to
maximize
f (R,P) = (R - F)N(R,P).
Let the solution be Rf (P). If the variable input is produced compet-
itively, the fixed-input monopoly will operate at a point like f in
Figure 1. The slope of the Rf(P) curve cannot in general be signed
at f or elsewhere.
Similarly, a variable-input monopolist that must take R as
given will choose P to maximize
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TV(R,P) = (P - V)Q(R,P).
If R = F, operation will be at a point like v in Figure 1. As above,
the slope of the firm's optimal response function, PV(R), cannot be
signed.
A firm with control over both inputs, whether acquired through
tying arrangements or by other means, will seek to maximize total
profit, I -t f + v. It is easy to imbed this in the problem of
maximizing W subject to a lower bound constraint on A, the problem
with which most of the literature on two-part tariffs has been con-
cerned. Solutions to the latter problem correspond to stationary
points of
T(R,P) = (R,P) + (1-W)W(R,P), (13)
where 0 < w < 1.17 Values of near or equal to zero are generated
by weak or non-binding profit constraints, while values near unity
are associated with tight constraints. As moves from zero to unity,
the solution prices move along a locus of tangencies between iso-W
and iso-fE curves from a point like w in Figure 1 to a profit-maxi-
mizing point like .
In what follows, solutions corresponding to strictly positive
values of w are called two-part optima, with the two-part profit
maximum point being an extreme point in this set. The excluded
marginal-cost-pricing point w is called the unconstrained welfare
maximum.
Differentiating (13) and using equations (10), one obtains the
two basic first-order contitions:
-17-
TR = wN + [R-F+(P-V)q]NR + (P-V)[QR - qNR] = 0, (14a)
Tp = Q + [R-F+(P-V)q]Np + (P-V)[Qp - qNp] = 0. (14b)
The first term in both these conditions is times the direct revenue
gain on infra-marginal sales caused by an increase in R or P. This is
a pure transfer from buyers to the seller; it is valued here exactly
to the extent that profits matter. In both of equations (14), the
second term is the net profit on sales to the marginal customer, times
the derivative of N with respect to the decision variable. The mar-
ginal customer retains no surplus, since S(O) = R, so that the monop-
olist's profit gain on sales to that customer exactly equals the net
social welfare gain. The third term in both equations is (P-V) times
the change in the infra-marginal demand for the variable input induced
by an increase in R or P. (Note that the exclusion effect is sub-
tracted from the net effect.) This is again the relevant quantity for
both welfare and profit computations.
Suppose = 1 in conditions (14), so that they describe the two-
part profit maximum. Let R (P) be the result of solving (14a) for
R as a function of P, and let P (R) be similarly obtained from (14b).
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between R (P) and the fixed-input
monopoly locus, R f(P). It is easy to show that R intersects R from
above at point f and that they intersect only there. Thus if P exceeds
V, R must be held below the level that would maximize profit on the
fixed input alone, since increases in R tend to reduce Q and thus to
reduce profits on the variable input. Exactly symmetrically, P (R)
intersects PV(R) from the left at the variable-input monopoly point,
v. Finally, the second-order conditions for profit maximization imply
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that the R and P7 loci intersect as shown at the two-part profit
maximum, point ir.
In Case I, Proposition 1 establishes that the right-most bracketed
term in (14a) is zero, while the corresponding term in (14b) is equal
to the negative substitution effect, a. From the first of these relations
we have
Proposition 4: In Case I, the net profit from sales to the marginal
customer, [R-F+(P-V)q], is strictly positive at a two-part optimum.
Figure 1 is drawn so that profit maximization involves selling both
fixed and variable inputs at prices that exceed the corresponding mar-
ginal costs. This is not always optimal, however, as we now show.
Eliminating the bracketed term for profit on the marginal customer
from equations (14) and solving, one obtains
(P-V)/P = [/e ][1 - (Np/qNR)], (15)
where q = Q(R,P)/N(R,P) is the amount of the variable input used by the
average buyer. For profit maximization, w = 1. The condition for maxi-
mization of , profit on the variable input alone, replaces the right-
P -P .hand side of (15) with (l/eP). Since e is positive in Case I, Prop-
osition 1 establishes 17
Proposition 5: In Case I, at a two-part optimum, (P-V) has the sign
(q-q).
In the direct case, if P > V, the largest buyers, who have the largest
gross surpluses, make the largest contribution to profit. In the
inverse case, setting P < V creates the same situation, since then
-19-
those with the largest q's have the smallest surpluses and contribute
least to profit. Though the general message of Proposition 5 is
thus no surprise, it is interesting to learn that (q-q) is a sufficient
statistic for general demand patterns.
The relation between R and F is less simply described, as in-
tuition might suggest. After all, only differences in buyers' q's
can be observed or exploited by the seller, and only the variable
input price translates these demand differences into differential con-
tributions to profit. The price of the fixed input cannot be used to
discriminate; it plays a sort of residual role here.
Ng and Weisser [1974] assumed F = 0 in a situation like our Case
19
II and argued that the optimal R must be non-negative. Here we can
easily prove
Proposition 6 (Ng-Weisser): In Case I, R > 0 at a two-part optimum.
If the optimal R were negative, customers could receive a subsidy even
if they bought none of the variable input. All would elect to receive
the subsidy, and small changes in R or P would then have no effect on
N. Since QR = qNR in Case I, if NR = 0 condition (14a) would reduce to
wN = 0. This clearly cannot hold at a two-part optimum, so the optimal
R cannot be negative.
Leland and Meyer [1976] showed that if F = 0 in Case I, R must be
strictly positive. Their argument generalizes easily to non-negative
F:
Proposition 7 (Leland-Meyer): In Case I, if F is non-negative, R > 0
at a two-part optimum.
./I __
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If the optimal R is zero, condition (14a) may be written
TR = N - FNR + (P - V)QR = 0.
Since NR is negative, Proposition 7 is established by showing that
QR = 0, thus showing that R = 0 is incompatible with the necessary
condition (14a). The argument has two steps. (a) If R = 0 in Case I,
q must equal zero also. With downward sloping demand curves, positive
purchases must imply positive surplus, but with R = 0, S(e) = 0 also,
A A
and this means q = 0. (b) From Proposition 1, q = 0 implies QR = 0,
since R affects Q only by exclusion.
In order to investigate the general relation between R and F when
both are non-negative, eliminate (P-V) from equations (14) and re-arrange
to obtain
(R-F)/R = [w/> R][(qQR/Qp) - 1]. (16)
f
Maximization of f , profit from sales of the fixed input alone, requires
setting (R-F)/R equal to (1/pR). As with condition (15), the ordinary
elasticity is replaced here by the compensated elasticity. Note also
that conditions (15) and (16) are perfectly general; they do not depend
-R 
on any of the structure presented in Sections 2 and 3. Since is
positive, Proposition 1 can be used directly with condition (16) to
establish
Proposition 8: In Case I, at a two-part optimum (R-F) has the sign of
[(q - q)QR- ].
If all buyers are identical, q = q, and R > F, as Oi [1971]
observed. If q < q, Proposition 5 indicates that P is optimally below
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V, so it is no surprise that R must exceed F. On the other hand, if
the marginal customer buys more than average, as in the direct case,
the sign of (R-F) is in general ambiguous. In the direct case,
Propositions 5 and 8 indicate that greater buyer diversity, as measured
by a larger value of (q - q) tends to lower R and to raise P. The
stronger is the infra-marginal substitution effect, as measured by the
absolute value of , the greater demand response to increases in the
price of the variable input, and the more likely it is to be optimal
to earn profit on the fixed input by setting R above F.
In Case I, if q < q, the variable input is always sold below cost
at a two-part optimum, and profits are earned on sales of the fixed
input. If buyers are identical, the variable input is sold at cost, and
R is optimally set above F. This difference derives from the infra-
marginal substitution effect associated only with the variable input.
If q > q, the variable input is sold above cost, and the sign of (R-F)
is ambiguous. All else equal, the greater the gap between q and q, the
larger will be (P-V) and the smaller will be (R-F). If one thinks that
the direct case, with q > q, is typical and that considerable buyer
diversity is also the norm, this analysis suggests that pricing strat-
egies that involve "giving away the razor amd making money on the blades"
are more commonly optimal than policies in which most profits are earned
on sales of the fixed input. Casual empiricism supports this suggestion.2 0
V. Equilibria and Optima: Cases II and III
We now employ Propositions 2 and 3 to consider extensions of Prop-
ositions 4 - 8 to situations with income effects (Case II) or output
price effects (Case III). Since equations (15) and (16) hold in general,
it is important at the outset-to establish the sign of the compensated
-22-
~~~~~~- ~-Pderivative Qp and thereby that of the compensated elasticity e , along
with the signs of NR and R. First, we assume that conditions (11),
which ensure that marginal cost pricing maximizes welfare, hold globally.
In Case III, this suffices to prove that Qp is everywhere negative. In
Case II, these second-order conditions rule out Giffen goods by requiring
(a - ') to be negative. Unfortunately, this implies only that Qp < q.
We thus have Qp negative for inferior goods but of ambiguous sign for
normal goods. To rule out a variety of pathologies induced by strong
income effects, it appears necessary to assume explicitly that Qp is
21
everywhere negative in Case II also. It then follows that NR < 0 and
-R
- > 0 for all non-negative R and P in both cases.
In Case II, the right-most bracketed term in (14a) is equal to (-q),
while in Case III it equals (R ). Proposition 4 thus generalizes to
Proposition 4': The net profit from sales to the marginal customer,
[R-F+(P-V)q], is strictly positive at a two part optimum in Case II if
(P-V) < 0 and in Case III if (P-V)CR > 0.
If P > V, the sign of marginal profit is in general ambiguous for normal
goods in Case II and for inferior inputs in Case III. In both these
situations, reductions in R stimulate infra-marginal demand, and if
P > V it may be optimal even for a profit-maximizer to lower R to the
point where money is lost on the marginal customer.
Application of Propositions 2 and 3 to the variable input markup
condition, equation (15), establishes
Proposition 5': At a two-part optimulm, (P-V) has the sign of (q - q)
A R
in Case II and the sign of [(q - q) + (-1/NR) I in Case III.
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Cases I and II are identical here. In Case III, for normal inputs, it
is sufficient but not necessary (as in Cases I and II) that q exceed q
for P to exceed V. To see why, assume for the moment that all purchasing
firms are identical and that a profit-maximizer has set P = V and R > F,
as would be optimal in Cases I and II. As (a) of Proposition 3 indicates,
the seller can then lower R by a small amount AR, increase P by more than
(AR)/q, and still leave N unchanged. (As was noted below Proposition 3,
this occurs because the increase in P lowers infra-marginal supplies of
the final output, thus tending to raise Z and N, while the drop in R has
no offsetting infra-marginal impact.) As this means that net revenue
from all customers is higher, profit is increased. Similarly, in the
special case of identical buyers, the monopolist optimally sets P below
V if the input is inferior, since this tends to increase Z and thereby
raise N.
If income effects are positive, strong enough, and appropriately
matched to household differences, it is apparently possible for the
optimal R to be negative in Case II. Proposition 6 generalizes as
follows:
Proposition 6': At a two-part optimum, R is non-negative in Case III.
R is also non-negative in Case II if any of the following are satisfied:
(a) n < 0, (b) (q-q)n < 0, or (c) -n-'/q < 0.
As in the proof of Proposition 6, if R is negative, NR = N = 0. In
Case III, Proposition 3 establishes that QR must then be zero also, and
necessary condition (14a) cannot be satisfied. In Case II, Proposition 2
shows that must be positive in order to satisfy this condition, so that
1..
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part (a) of Proposition 6' is established. Elimination of (P-V)/w
between conditions (14) yields the necessary condition
QP - QR = - + qn = Qp + (q - q) = 0.
Since a and Qp are negative, parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 6' follow
directly.
It is instructive to interpret the negatives of (a) - (c) in Prop-
osition 6' as necessary conditions for the optimal R to be negative in
Case II. First, part (a) indicates that the good must be normal, so that
a reduction in R stimulates infra-marginal demand for the variable input.
Second, q must exceed q, so that (by Proposition 5') it is optimal to set
P above V and earn a profit on that demand. Finally, the q-weighted average
income effect, which arises when P is changed, must be less than the un-
weighted average that gives the infra-marginal response to changes in R.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Leland-Meyer [1976] argument used to
establish that R is positive in Case I does not go through in either Case
II or Case III. That argument, presented to establish Proposition 7,
A A
above, has two main steps: (a) R=O > qO, and (b) q=0 => QR=0.
Step (a) fails in Case III, since a firm can have S = R = 0 and still
be using strictly positive amounts of all inputs. Step (b) fails in
Case II because of income effects on infra-marginal demand. Thus even
if F is positive in these Cases, it may be optimal to set R = 0, to use
ordinary uniform pricing even when a two-part tariff is feasible. 2 3
Finally, use of condition (16) and Propositions 2 and 3 establishes
the following generalization of Poposition 8:
Proposition 8': At a two-part optimum, (R-F) has the sign of [(q-q)QR - QP]
___I-LLLYI -^l-lyll--l-D·lll-·-LLLU·^LIILLII-_ -~.^ I · · LI-L·III~ 
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in Case II and the sign of [(q-q)QR - Qp - (QR/NR)TR] in Case III.
The qualitative implications for Case II are exactly the same as those
discussed below Proposition 8 for Case I. (Recall that Qp = a in Case I.)
Just as a large value of R was shown in Proposition 5' to make it more
likely that (P-V) is positive, so it is shown here to make it more likely
that (R-F) is negative. The intuition is the same in both situations.
VI. Local Comparisons: Case I
This Section and the next are devoted to pairwise comparisons among
24the four equilibria depicted in Figure 1: w, f, v, and i. Two of
these comparisons are straightforward: the move from w to f or from w to
v is an ordinary move from competition to monopoly under our constant cost
assumption. Both transitions involve drops in N, Q, and W. The comparison
between f and v involves two partial monopoly positions; it is neither
especially tractable nor especially interesting.
The three comparisons that remain are more interesting: w versus ,
f versus , and v versus . Since fT is not quite an ordinary monopoly
equilibrium point, its relation to w is not obvious in all respects. The
final two comparisons are directly relevant to public policy toward tying
contracts and sales below cost. If a firm has a monopoly only over some
specialized machine and acts as an ordinary monopolist, it will operate
at a point like f in Figure 1. If it can move to either by selling the
variable input below cost so as to raise the optimal rental or (as drawn)
by requiring buyers of the fixed input to purchase the variable input
from it at a price above V, it can raise its profits. Both sorts of
actions can give the firm serious antitrust problems; our aim here is to
investigate the economic basis of udicial hostility. Similarly, a firm
I _ _
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operating as a variable input monopolist at a point like v in Figure 1
will seek to move to r either by selling the fixed input below cost so
as to stimulate demand for the variable input or (as drawn) by requiring
purchase of the fixed input at a price above cost. The issue is whether
on economic grounds such actions should be applauded or attacked when the
model developed here is relevant. 2 5
A general equity point arises in all three comparisons. By assumption,
consumer's surplus or producer's profits are increasing in 0 in all three
Cases. Similarly, it follows directly from the analysis in Sections 2
and 3 that (So)/aP = -q/ae. In the direct case, q rises with , so that
increases in P tend to equalize surplus or profits across buyers, as Figure
2 illustrates. In Case III, this means that small firms are hurt less than
large firms, relatively, by policies involving larger values of P. While
this might generally be viewed as progressive incidence, the corresponding
equalization of consumers' surpluses in Cases I and II may be progressive
or regressive, depending on the real incomes of the households involved. 26
Similarly, in the inverse case increases in P increase the inequality of
S across buyers; see Figure 2 for an illustration. In what follows, these
sorts of changes are termed equalizing and inequalizing, respectively.
Except for w, all equilibria shown in Figure 1 are monopoly points,
and their characteristics are dependent upon the values of a number of
demand elasticities. The usual problem encountered in comparing monopoly
equilibria, the inability to say much a priori about changes in those
elasticities between distinct points, is present here. One might deal
with this problem by working with arbitrary but tractable functional forms
for m(e) and S(P,Z,0), then hoping that the results obtained are valid
for a large set of other functions as well. The approach taken here is
_I__II__II1II___IYYIIIIIIYLE·I-II_ .·III*IIII IIY ILIUI
-(-IIIIIIIUlsl--lill--L--_l^·_l- I1·--·-----·I-1I
-27-
instead to confine the analysis to comparisons of equilibria that are
sufficiently close that first-order approximations can be employed in
comparative analysis. This yields results that do not depend on complete
descriptions of functional forms, but one can only hope that these have
some value when equilibria are a non-negligible distance apart.
Let us begin with the comparison of w, the unconstrained welfare
maximum, and some two-part equilibrium "nearby" on the rest of the w¶
locus. The comparison of w and r is a special case of this. It is
obvious that a move away from w must lower welfare. The first-order
approximations to changes in N and Q are simply
AQ = QR(AR) + Q(AP), and = NR(AR) + Np(UP). (17)
We assume that the two points being compared are sufficiently close
that (17) can be used along with the tangent to the w locus to evaluate
changes in Q and N. Differentiating conditions (14) totally with respect
to w and evaluating the resultant system at LoO, one obtains
dR/dw = K(QNp - NQp), and dP/dw = K(NNp - QNR). (18)
where K is a positive constant by the second-order conditions (11).
Note that dP/dw has the sign of (q - q) in Case I, as it should.
Assuming that the changes in (17) are proportional to the deriva-
tives in (18), substitution yields
Q Q(QRNp - QpNR) + NQp(Np - QR )' (19a)
AN N[(Np) - NRQp], (19b)
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where "s" is shorthand for "has the same sign as," and all derivatives
are evaluated at the unconstrained welfare maximum. Application of
Proposition 1 and conditions (11) establishes
Proposition 9: In Case I, if the unconstrained welfare maximum and
a two-part optimum are sufficiently close, a move from the former to
the latter lowers Q and N. Such a move is equalizing in both the direct
and inverse cases.
In comparisons not involving the unconstrained welfare maximum,
the direction of movement of W is a priori uncertain. From the first
equalities in conditions (10) and equations (17), we obtain the relevant
first-order approximation:
AW = (R - F)I + (P - V)AQ. (20)
Note that at the fixed-input (variable-input) monopoly point, the
second (first) term is zero, and AW has the same sign as IQ (AN).
Now consider movements from the fixed input monopoly point, point
f in Figure 1, to the two-part profit maximum, point . From Figure 1,
movement from f to ff can always be accomplished by movement along the
R7(P) locus, defined by first-order condition (14a) with w = 1. If
the two points are close together, one need only know the slope of that
locus at f. Re-writing (14a) in terms of the elasticity pR and differ-
entiating, one obtains that slope as
RRR R
where pR and R are the partial derivatives of R with respect to P and
R, respectively, at point f. The second-order conditions for a fixed-
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input monolopy ensure that the denominator is positive.
Substitution of (dR/dP)f(AP) for (AR) in (17) and substitution
into (20) yield
AW AN {N[N PR -NRP] + NRNP + NR1IR[QR - NP] }AP. (21)
The corresponding expression for the sign of Q cannot easily be simpli-
fied. But use of Proposition 1 allows one to re-write (21) as
w AN = { R + q[(UR/R) -_ U ]}t. (22)
A sufficient condition for W and AN to have the sign of AP is clearly
R ^R R
Up > qpR. It is reasonable, I think, to expect Up to be non-negative.
This means that increases in P, which lower the demand curve facing a
fixed-input monopoly, do not raise such a monopoly's optimal price. The
sign of VIR seems a priori less clear. The sufficient condition above is
satisfied if Up is non-negative and if, for constant P, the demand curve
for the fixed input has constant elasticity at f. If that demand curve
is linear, however, it is worth noting that the bracketed expression
multiplying q in (22) is negative, so that Up must then be strictly posi-
tive for AW and AN to have the sign of AP. Using Proposition 5 to sign
LP, we have
Proposition 10: In Case I, if the fixed input monopoly point and the
R ^
two-part profit maximum are sufficiently close, and if R q R, then
in a move from the former to the latter, AP, tW, and N all have the
sign of .(q-q). Such a move is equalizing in both direct and indirect
cases.
-30-
This analysis provides little support for antitrust hostility toward
tying contracts based on monopoly power over fixed inputs. Though the
elasticity change condition in Proposition 10 is surely not satisfied in
all cases, it surely holds with positive probability in most cases.
Moreover, it is not a necessary condition. Even in some situations in
which it does not hold, a move from f to r accomplished by a tying con-
tract or equivalent metering device that raises P increases both the
number of buyers and aggregate welfare. Such ties tend to be equalizing,
so there is no obvious inter-buyer equity problem. Section 7 shows that
these properties are also generally present in Cases II and III. Unless
a two-part pricing arrangement has serious undesirable long-run effects
of some sort or one knows for certain that the sufficient condition in
Proposition 10 fails badly, its adoption seems more likely to deserve
applause than attack. Note also that tying contracts apparently may
result in enough of a drop in the price of the fixed input so that total
sales of the variable input rise.
On the other hand, local movements from f to via sales of the
variable input below cost (to permit increases in R) seem socially
unattractive on the basis of Proposition 10. Such movements are likely
to be equalizing, but this would seem to be overshadowed by reductions in
the number of buyers and in total welfare. One might want to take
seriously the almost inevitable charges of predation in such cases,
even if the monopolist has no predatory intentions.
The analysis of movements from the variable-input monopoly point,
point v in Figure 1, to the two-part profit maximum, , is essentially
symmetrical in form to that just presented. The results are a bit
weaker, however, reflecting the more complex relation between R and F
-31-
at . In terms of Figure 1, we need the slope of the P (R) locus at
v. Writing (14b) in terms of the elasticity e and differentiating,
that slope is given by
(dP/dR) = [PeP N - PQeR]/[PQeP + Qe P (eP -1)],
P P P
where e and eP are the partial derivatives of the elasticity eP with
respect to P and R, respectively, at point v. The denominator is posi-
tive by the second-order conditions for a variable-input monopoly.
Substitution of (dP/dR)V(AR) for (AP) in (17) and substitution into
(20) yields
LW s AQ s {Q[QRe - QpeR] + QPQR + e Qp(Np-QR)}PR. (23)
The corresponding expression for AN does not simplify usefully. In
Case I, Proposition 1 allows (23) to be re-written as
AW Q {[q + ) + (eP/QR)] - eP . (24)
As above, it is reasonable to expect eR to be non-negative, while the
likely sign of e seems less clear. In any case, use of Proposition 8
to sign AR yields
Proposition 11: In Case I, if the variable-input monopoly point and
^P P
the two-part profit maximum are sufficiently close, and if qeR > ep,
then in a move from the latter to the former, AR, W, and AQ have the
same sign. If eR > 0, such a move is equalizing in the inverse case.
In the inverse case, Proposition 8 shows that R must increase, and
eR > 0 is sufficient for P (R) to be negatively sloped at v, so that P
R -
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falls. In the direct case R may rise or fall, so that P may rise or
fall also, and the change considered may be equalizing or inequalizing.
The sufficient condition given in Proposition 11 is clearly not
necessary. On the same sort of argument made below Proposition 10,
Proposition 11 indicates that one can expect tying contracts based on
monopoly power over the variable input to increase both the usual
welfare measure and total sales of the variable input. If efficiency
were the only aim of public policy, this would argue against the current
antitrust hostility toward such tying arrangements. The equity impli-
cations of ties based on variable-input monopoly power are a bit less
clear, however. Even in Case I, the total number of buyers may rise
or fall. If eR is non-negative, a move from v to T via a tie that
raises R also lowers P and is thus inequalizing in the direct case.
Movements from the variable-input monopoly point to the two-part
profit maximum via sales of the fixed input below cost generally lower
welfare and sales of the variable input. By Proposition 8, q > q is
necessary for the optimal R to be less than F, so that moving from v
to by selling the fixed input below cost and raising P is most likely
equalizing. Thus Proposition 11, like Proposition 10, suggests that
tying contracts and related pricing arrangements may be much more
socially desirable than persistent sales below cost that aim at achiev-
ing the same sort of price discrimination. Proposition 10 makes a
stronger case, though.
VII. Local Comparisons: Cases II and III
This Section briefly presents the generalizations of Propositions
9 - 11 to Cases II and III. This requires re-examination of equations
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(19), (21), and (23), which hold in all three Cases.
The first term on the right of (19a) and the right-hand side of
(19b) are always negative by conditions (11). The second term on the
right of (19a) is equal to (NQpn) in Case II and equal to zero in Case
III. Using Proposition 5' to sign the change in P, one can establish
Proposition 9': If the unconstrained welfare maximum and a two-part
optimum are sufficiently close, a move from the former to the latter
lowers N in Cases II and III, and it also lowers Q in Case III and if
n > 0 in Case II. Such a move is equalizing in Case II in both the
direct and inverse cases. It is equalizing in Case III in the direct
(inverse) case for normal (inferior) inputs.
The third term in brackets on the right of (21) is zero in Case
III and (-NR fn) in Case II. Applying Propositions 2, 3, and 5' again,
we obtain
Proposition 10': If the fixed-input monopoly point and the two-part
profit maximum are sufficiently close, a move from the former to the
latter has the following properties. In Case II, AP, W and AN all have
R R
the sign of (q - q) if > 0 and Bp > qpR, and the move is equalizing
in both direct and inverse cases. In Case III, P, AW, and AN all have
t R )]R
the same sign if Bp > [q + (RN R) ] R, and the move is equalizing in
the direct (inverse) case for normal (inferior) inputs.
In Case II, ties may be welfare-reducing for inferior goods with strong
income effects even if the elasticity change condition is satisfied.
Finally, consider equation (23). The right-most term in brackets
is again zero in Case III, and it equals (e Qp n) in Case II. Applying
  I_
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Propositions 2, 3, and 8' yields
Proposition 11': If the variable-input monopoly point and the two-
part profit maximum are sufficiently close, a move from the former to
the latter has the following properties. In Case II, AR, AW, and Q
P P
have the same sign if n < 0 and (Qp/QR)eR > e; the latter condition
alone is sufficient in Case III. If e > 0, such a move is equalizing
in the inverse case in Case II and in the inverse case for inferior
inputs in Case III.
It is interesting to note that normal goods with strong income effects
cause trouble here, while inferior goods stand out in the analysis of
local movements from point f in Proposition 10'.
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Appendix
Define the marginal firm type as a function of Z, R, and P by
S(P,Z,O*) = R. (Al)
All firms with 0 > * purchase the fixed input. Differentiation of (Al)
and use of equations (7) establish
e = 1/S(P,Z,0*) >0,
e* = q(P,z,*)6e > 0,P R
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)e*z = -x(P,Z,*) < 0.
The key function Z(P,R) is then defined implicitly by
4(R,P,Z) =
1
f x(P,Z,0)m(0)dO - D(Z) = 0
0*(R,P,Z)
Differentiation and use of (7) yield
R = - 0* x(0*) m(e*) < 0,
p = - 0R q(0*) x(0*) m(0*) - a , where
1
a = qz(P,Z,0)m(e)d0,
0*
2
$Z = 0R x(0*) m(0*) + 6 > 0, where
1
6 = f xZ (P,Z,0)m(0)d - D(Z) > 0.
0*
(AS)
(A6)
(A7)
(A7)
_
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As is noted in the text below (8), a is positive for normal inputs and
negative for inferior inputs. The sign of p is thus in general ambiguous
for inferior inputs. Note that 6 is the derivative of infra-marginal
excess supply (holding the set of suppliers fixed) with respect to output
price.
Since ZR = -R/tZ > 0, it follows that an increase in R always
raises the output price. Equation (A5) makes it clear that this occurs
because such increases exclude marginal suppliers; if Z is unchanged
there is no impact on infra-marginal firms. On the other hand, as
Panzar and Willig [1978] stress, Zp = -p/4Z cannot be signed in general.
In the normal case, an increase in P serves both to exclude marginal
suppliers and to reduce the supply of infra-marginal firms, thus in-
creasing Z. (Recall that qz = - xp from (7c).) In the inferior case,
however, infra-marginal supply is increased, and the net impact on
price is ambiguous.
Given Z(R,P), the marginal customer type can be written as a
function of R and P only:
O(R,P) = *[R,P,Z(R,P)]. (A8)
Differentiation of (A8) and use of (7) and (A2) - (A4) yield
A^~ AA - ^1~~netefeco R lor, a r) 
P P Z R R
Since R affects Z only through exclusion of marginal suppliers, the
net effect of R must be to lower N, and thus to raise . Similarly,
-37-
op is necessarily positive in the inferior case but may be negative for
a normal input. In the latter case, market price is increased as
infra-marginal suppliers substitute away from the variable input, and
this indirect effect may outweigh the direct exclusionary effect of
higher P on marginal firms. If the input is inferior, increases in
infra-marginal supply lower Z and thus amplify the direct exclusionary
effect.
 _ __I_ I
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Footnotes
1. Oi [1971] and Blackstone [1975] discuss interesting examples of
both explicit and implicit metering. The classic analysis of
tying contracts as metering devices is Bowman [1957]. Tying con-
tracts may serve other purposes, of course; see, for instance,
Burstein [1960], Singer [1968, chs. 15-17], Gould [1977], Blair
and Kaserman [1978], Scherer [1980, pp. 582-4], Cummings and
Ruhter [1979], and Peterman [1979].
2. The main works in this literature seem to be Feldstein [1972], Ng
and Weisser [1974], Littlechild [1975], Leland and Meyer [1976],
and Mitchell [1978]. Gabor [1955] provides an early analysis of
profit-maximizing two-part structures.
3. On such tariffs, see Buchanan [1953], Leland and Meyer [1976], Murphy
[1977], Willig [1978], Rberts [1979], Spence [1979], Ordover and
Panzar [1980b], and the references they cite.
4. The central role of variability here clearly distinguishes the
subject of this essay from the fixed-proportion bundling schemes
that have been studied by a number of authors, most notably Adams
and Yellen [1976].
5. Income elasticities of demand do appear in Feldstein [1972], Little-
child [1975], and Mitchell [1978], but income serves only as a
characteristic along which households differ; changes in R do not
affect infra-marginal demand. Feldstein's analysis differs sharply
from that in this paper in that he treats N as fixed, so that R
becomes a lump-sum tax that households cannot avoid. Littlechild
errs in neglecting the effect of P on N.
6. One of the important early cases involving tying contracts, for
I __ __ _
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instance, dealt with a patented machine for attaching buttons to
shoes: Heaton Penninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co., 77 F. 288 [6th Cr., 1896]. One reason for suspecting that
interaction through output price might be qualitatively important
here is the demonstration by Ordover and Panzar [1980a] that such
interaction can undo the main results of Willig [1978] in a sit-
uation related to that considered here.
7. Littlechild [1975, p. 666] conjectures but does not prove that
0 < R < F could be optimal in Case I.
8. For recent analyses of these pricing strategies, see Kwoka [1979]
and Schmalensee [1981], respectively.
9. Mitchell [1978] derives these relations (in elasticity form) after
assuming a particular functional form for S(P,0).
10. In their analysis of this Case, Ng and Weisser [1974] maximize
the integral over > 0 of {I[P,Y(0)-R,0]m(0)} subject to a profit-
ability constraint. They treat Y(e) as a control variable, which
turns out to be optimally employed to make I an increasing linear
function of qy. Their formulae cannot be used in the pure profit-
maximization case, since changes in P or R do not then invoke the
compensating changes in Y(0) that Ng and Weisser employ. Moreover,
their approach seems less natural in most situations involving
public enterprises than that taken in the normative analysis below,
where it is assumed (in effect) that Y(0) is exogenously fixed and
that I(0) is constant for all 0.
11. On this theorem, see, for instance, Diewert [1974, Sect. 2].
12. See, for instance, Diewert [1974, Sect. 3]. As Diewert shows, S
must be jointly convex in P and Z. Strict convexity in Z is
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assumed for simplicity in what follows; this means that firms'
marginal cost functions are rising over the relevant range (because
xZ > 0) and that firms' input demand functions, holding output
price constant, are declining (because qp < 0).
13. Because marginal cost is rising for each firm, an increase in
output price must raise the optimal x. Since input prices haven't
changed, q increases if and only if the input is normal. See
Panzar and Willig [1978] for a clear presentation of these relations.
It should be noted that "normal" here corresponds to "strongly
normal" there, and "inferior" here corresponds to "strongly inferior"
there.
14. See footnote 12, above, on the assumption necessary for a to be
strictly negative. We are operating in a smooth neoclassical world.
15. By "distribution-free", I mean that the social marginal utility of
income is taken as unity for all households and firms. Feldstein
[1972] presents an alternative framework in which that marginal
utility is a given function of income. See also footnote 10,
above, on the analysis of Ng and Weisser [1974].
16. Littlechild [1975] proves this for Case I, but he assumes that N
does not depend on P. He also modifies his model to allow increases
in N to confer positive externalities on infra-marginal customers.
17. If W is maximized subject to a lower bound on , and X is the non-
negative associated multiplier, w = X/(l+X). It should be clear
that the second-order conditions for this constrained maximum
problem do not correspond to those for concavity of (R,P) except
when is zero or one. On this approach, see Spence [1979].
__
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18. Oi [1971] argues that in Case I non-crossing demand curves ensure
P > V, and he shows by example that P may be less than V in the
inverse case. Littlechild [1975] obtains equation (14) for Case
I, except that his neglect of the impact of P on N causes him to
have ep in place of ep.
19. Footnote 10, above, describes the differences between Case II and
the model of Ng and Weisser [1974].
20. See, for instance, the examples of tying arrangements discussed
by Singer [1963, pp. 189-190] and Scherer [1980, pp. 582-4] and
the case study presented by Blackstone [1975].
21. Ng and Weisser [1974] deal with income effects without making an
assumption of this sort. This stems from their use of the income
distribution as a control variable, as footnote 10, above, dis-
cusses.
22. By treating the income distribution as a control variable (see
footnote 10, above), Ng and Weisser [1974] eliminate this possibility
by essentially eliminating income effects.
23. Ordover and Panzar [1980b] have recently investigated necessary and
sufficient conditions for the optimality of positive R when F = 0
in Case III with identical firms.
24. It is generally assumed that these points are distinct, though it
is possible for to coincide with either f or v.
25. This essay treats tying contracts only as a method of price discrim-
ination; the other functions discussed by the references cited in
footnote 1, above, are outside our analysis. Similarly, sales
below cost are evaluated only as part of a discriminatory pricing
arrangement, though such conduct may in fact have other objectives
I__ -· 1-_11 -·-
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such as entry deterrence or predation.
26. Feldstein [1972] is concerned with the linkage between these two
sorts of incidence in this context.
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